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Monday 21 March 1983

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USSR-LIBYA: Co	ommunique on Treaty		_
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	ent in principle to conclude a tr ects the expansion of Soviet-Lib		
two years, but th	e communique in which it was	announced suggests	
the treaty will co	ntain no Soviet commitment to	Libya's security.	25X1
The versions	of the communique published	separately by the	
	Soviets on Saturday following		
	Moscow last week contained a unlike the Libyan, characterize		
Premier Tikhono	v as "frank," and it omitted th	e expression of "deep	
satisfaction with Libyan version.	the results of this fruitful visit"	contained in the	25X1
			25/(1
In the text is	sued by Tripoli, Moscow condents near Libya last month and s	emned US naval and	
	anctity of its land, air, and terr		
Soviet version w	as more general and made no		
right to defend i	is borders.		25 X 1
	The Libyans' apparent desire to		
	ent of Soviet support from Jallusion to announce the treaty be		
Libyan leader Q	adhafi's desire for Soviet prote	ection probably has	
increased becau	ise of his recent foreign policy g for a treaty that includes spe	setbacks. He is almost	
Libyan security.	1 101 a treaty that includes spe	chic communents to	25X1
	. he willing to enough to possib	No requests for	
	y be willing to accede to possib egular Soviet access to Libyan		
in return. The co	ommunique suggests, however,	, that Moscow is still	05)/4
unwilling to mak	te a commitment to Libyan sec	eurity.	25X1
	s Soviet unwillingness may hav		
	reaty during Jallud's visit, othe Qadhafi's absence could have t		
	ould have insisted on his perso	•	
	eremonies. Moreover, differen		
	s, especially the delayed Libyar uld require further negotiation		
signed.	,	•	25X1
The announ	cement of the treaty will not he	elp Moscow's current	
efforts to impro	ve relations with Egypt, other A		
Iraq.			25X1
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EC: Currency Crisis Looms	٠	÷
The European Community's Council of Finance Minis far failed to agree on a currency realignment for the Euro Monetary System at its current meeting in Brussels.		25X1
West German Finance Minister Stoltenberg, who is Fithe Council, announced to the press following the difficulty yesterday that foreign exchange fixings and central bank in the EMS currencies would be temporarily suspended to Council is to meet early in the day in hopes of resolving to before the summit meeting of the EC heads of government begins later today.	It meeting intervention today. The the impasse	25X1
Inflation and a hard to finance and growing trade def	iait in France	
Inflation and a hard-to-finance and growing trade def have put strong pressure on the franc. During the last th the Bank of France and other central banks have interven keep the exchange rates within the EMS band.	ree months	25X1
Stoltenberg also told the press he was working on a formula. The press reported changes being discussed we percent revaluation of the West German mark and a 2-t devaluation of the franc.	ere a 5- to 6-	25X1
French Finance Minister Delors threatened several ti France would pull out of the EMS if a satisfactory solution be reached. He said France will ask for a large new EC los as much as \$6 billion—and suggested that the present 4 EMS band be widened to 6 or 8 percent.	n could not an—perhaps	25X1
Comment : The suspension of foreign exchange fixin intervention by the monetary authorities will cause confu financial markets, and the longer it takes the EC to reach	sion in the	
agreement the more uncertainty there will be. Leaving the possibility open to Paris only at great economic and poli Economically, a large devaluation of the franc would be Paris would lose access to funds from the EC; politically	e EMS is a tical cost. certain and	
would tend to isolate France.	the Hiove	25X1
President Mitterrand's concurrent reshuffling of the cinfluence France's final position. Foreign Trade Minister resigned, and, if Prime Minister Mauroy is replaced as spathe press, Delors' position and the likelihood of further a	Jobert has peculated by	

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
measures would be enhanced.

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EC: Summit Meeting	·
EC leaders meet in Brussels today to discuss—in addition to the currency crisis—growing problems in agricultural trade with the US,	
East-West relations, and the situation in the Middle East.	25X1
Community members have expressed concern that the dispute with the US over subsidized sales of agricultural products is close to developing into a trade war. The heads of government are expecting Commissioners Haferkamp and Dalsager to report on their consultations in Washington last week, which were aimed at avoiding	25.74
an open confrontation.	25X1
EC leaders also are to review Community policy toward the USSR following Denmark's unilateral decision last month to withdraw from EC trade sanctions. In addition, they plan to prepare a statement on	
the Middle East.	25X1
Comment: The EC leaders probably will initiate no new policies at the two-day session, because preparation by West Germany, as Council president, has been inadequate. Nevertheless, the heads of government may agree to bring up the agricultural trade issue at the economic summit in Williamsburg, Virginia. France has been urging other EC members to restrict US agricultural imports, and a negative report by the Commission on its "last-ditch" effort in Washington will	-
be likely to convince EC leaders that such action is necessary.	25X1
Danish withdrawal from the EC sanctions can easily be accommodated by other members and probably will not lead to EC legal action against Copenhagen. Denmark's decision, however, may prompt new discussions on the continued effectiveness of the sanctions and weaken Community resolve to continue the measures	
through the end of the year. EC leaders also are likely to talk about starting discussions with other industrialized countries on	
rescheduling Poland's debt.	25X1
On the Middle East, the Ten probably will issue a statement deploring continuing obstacles to peace, including the lack of progress in the negotiations on Lebanon and the continuing spread of	
Israeli settlements in occupied territory.	25X1

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NICARAGUA: Anti-Sandinistas Seek Support		
Political leaders of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force a visit to six European capitals, may gain the organization	e, currently on on greater	
respectability.		25X1
The leaders hope to convince European governmen leaders that armed struggle is justified and that the Den	nocratic Force	
is not dominated by former members of Somoza's Nati	onal Guard.	25X1
		23/11
The Democratic Force is publicating the peace plan	it issued in	
The Democratic Force is publicizing the peace plan January, which rejects any linkage to the former Somoz	a regime and	
outlines changes necessary to restore Nicaraguan dem	ocracy.	. 25 X 1
Democratic Force officials claim that Alfonso Robel	o. leader of	
the anti-Sandinista Democratic Revolutionary Alliance-	-which is	
based in Costa Rica—said when he met with them last wants to cooperate. In addition, they claim that the lead		
Alliance faction has abandoned it and joined the Demo	cratic Force.	
Former Sandinista hero Eden Pastora, who heads a thin remains opposed because of the presence of former Na		
Guardsmen in the Democratic Force.	ational	25X1
Comment: The greater willingness of Robelo and for	orojan loodoro	
to meet with Democratic Force officials reflects the suc-	cess of the	
shakeup in the political leadership last December, which	h installed	
known opponents of former President Somoza. The Europeobably will enhance the organization's prestige, even	ropean visit if it does not	
result in public endorsements.		25 X 1
The Democratic Force's quest for wider political su	pport—and	
possible cooperation with the Democratic Alliance—is I	ikely to hinge	
on overcoming the political liability of its links to former Guardsmen. The political leadership acknowledges that	' National : its military	
counterparts are former Guard officers, but it claims the	at they were	
not close associates of Somoza or guilty of abuses.		25X1

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EGYPT: Mubarak's Improved Standing		
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President Mubarak's recent efforts to reduce corrupt and to assert Egypt's interests abroad appear to have sti		
his popularity.	enginenea	25X1
The recent dismissal of two ministers implicated in the	he corruption	
trial of the late President Sadat's half brother should income for Mubarak, according to the US Embassy. The firings	rease respect have helped	
to restrain opposition charges that Mubarak is not serio	us about	
rooting out corruption in high places.		25X1
The Embassy also reports that Mubarak's highly put		
meetings with other Arab leaders at the Nonaligned Sun served him well at home by demonstrating that Egypt is	nmit have	
rapprochement with moderate Arab states on its own te	rms. In	
addition, many Egyptians have applauded the President	's rebuttal of	
the anti-Egyptian <u>statement issued</u> in Algiers by the Pale National Council.	estine	25X1
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Comment: Mubarak's popularity has fluctuated in the		
major failure of public services in Cairo, an outbreak of C violence, or provocative new Israeli actions in Lebanon of	optic-Muslim or the West	
Bank could rapidly erode his position.		25X1
The drop in oil prices has further clouded Egypt's fut	ure. The loss	
of foreign earnings is forcing the government to reduce of	economic	
growth targets and may ultimately require risky austerity	measures.	25X1
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


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THAILAND: Elected House Dissolved	
Prime Minister Prem dissolved the elected House of Representatives on Saturday and called for national elections on 18 April. The decree cited fears of political conflict and violence in the wake of last week's voting on constitutional amendments.	
Comment: Prem's action should reduce the chances of a coup, since military equities in forming a new government will continue to be represented by the Senate. The early election date allows the military-supported Senate to predominate once more in forming a new government immediately before its powers lapse. Because no civilian political party appears strong enough to gain a majority of seats in	
parliament, the Senate probably will play a decisive role in selecting the Prime Minister. Prem remains the likely choice for the post as a	
figure acceptable both to military leaders and to civilians.	

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
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


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ports and force much as 1 million untries also are rn to the US and ases and aid.	25X1 25X1
	Syria recently studies to choose a culminates nearly a The USSR also has R's largest e Soviets Moscow is awarded y will require up to e project is in the are moving slowly Africa by 60 estimates. South all of its neighbors outs and force much as 1 million untries also are in to the US and





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